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NOTES
PENNSYLVANIA'S TECHNOLOGICALLY
IMPOSSIBLE AIR POLLUTION
STANDARDS UPHELD

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-CLEAN AIR ACT: The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court upholds the imposition of fines for noncompliance
with technologically impossible standards of pollution control under
Pennsylvania's implementation plan of the federal Clean Air Act.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Env'tl Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co.,
490 Pa. 399, 416 A.2d 995 (1980).
INTRODUCTION
Imposition of technologically impossible and economically infeasible air pollution control standards under the federal Clean Air Act
(CAA)' has long been an issue in both federal and state enforcement
proceedings. 2 Federal case law has clearly proscribed federal agency
consideration of impossibility in the formulation and implementation of national pollution control standards.' The doctrine of technology forcing is the basis for that proscription. The assumption
underlying that doctrine is that imposing technologically impossible
air pollution control standards and penalties for violations upon
American industry will force rapid technological development. 4
Technological innovation is expedited by placing the burden of compliance with pollution standards on the polluter. Although federal
agencies are bound to technology-forcing standards, case law has also
indicated that state courts and agencies may consider the defenses of
impossibility and infeasibility when enforcing those standards.' The
question remained whether state courts and agencies were obligated
to consider those defenses in enforcement proceedings. A recent
Pennsylvania case, PennsylvaniaDep 't of EnvironmentalResources v.
Pennsylvania Power Co., 6 held that the Pennsylvania Department of
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858 (1976)).
2. See, e.g., Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975);Union Electric v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299 (8thCir. 1979); Friends
of the Earth v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 419 F. Supp. 528 (D.D.C. 1976); Pennsylvania
Dep't of Env'tl Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 490 Pa. 399, 416 A.2d 995 (1980).
3. Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).

4. Id. at 256-57.
5. Id. at 266-67; Union Electric v. EPA, 593 F.2d 299, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1979).
6. 490 Pa. 399, 416 A.2d 995 (1980).
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Environmental Resources had the authority to reject those defenses
and impose fines for violations of technologically impossible standards. The Pennsylvania court further found it desirable and constitutional to force technological innovation by the imposition of civil
penalties under the Pennsylvania implementation plan of the CAA.
CLEAN AIR ACT-REGULATORY SCHEME
The federal CAA and its amendments 7 represent a drastic attempt
to remedy the problem of air pollution. They act as a "comprehensive programmatic and regulatory system on the subject of air pollution" 8 and are the only major federal legislation on the subject.
The 1970 amendments to the CAA established three regulatory
programs to address three different pollution problems: "(1) pollution from existing sources; (2) emissions of hazardous pollutants; and
(3) emissions from future stationary and mobile sources." 9 The
amendments expand the federal role in pollution control by providing
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declare air quality
criteria and national ambient air quality standards.' 0 They further
direct the EPA administrator to publish and maintain a current list
enumerating certain pollutants that may adversely affect public
health or welfare." The amendments then require the EPA administrator to issue national ambient air quality standards for all the specified pollutants within 12 months after publication of that list.' 2
Section 110 of the CAA holds the states responsible "for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement" of the national ambient
air quality standards. "3 These responsibilities are carried out through
7. 42 U.S.C. § § 7401-7642 (Supp. II 1978) (amending 42 U.S.C. § § 1857-1858
(1976)).
8. W. RODGERS, HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 214 (1977).
9. Parish, Enforcement and Litigation under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,
12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 435, 436 (1979).
10. 42 U.S.C. § § 1857c-3, -4 (1976) (amended 1977).
11. (1) For the purpose of establishing national primary and secondary ambient
air quality standards, the Administrator shall within 30 days after December
31, 1970, publish, and shall from time to time thereafter revi~e, a list which
includes each air pollutant(A) which in his judgment has an adverse affect on public health or welfare;
(B) the presence of which in the ambient air results from numerous or diverse mobile or stationary sources; and
(C) for which air quality criteria had not been issued before December 31,
1970 but for which he plans to issue air quality criteria under this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(1) (1976) (amended 1977).
12. Id. § 1857c-3(a)(2) (amended 1977).
13. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (amended 1977).
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state implementation plans, which must be approved by the EPA administrator.' ' Eight general subjects must be addressed in those
plans: "(1) attaining the standards within the time period prescribed;
(2) inclusion of emission limitations and other controls; (3) monitoring; (4) preconstruction review of new sources; (5) intergovernmental
cooperation; (6) administrative requirements for state agencies; (7)
inspection and testing of motor vehicles; (8) a revision authority." '1
Although the federal government retains broad powers and preemptive rights in certain areas, responsibility for enforcement of the
CAA lies mainly at the state level, and a liberal attitude towards state
1
authority to grant variances of requirements has been encouraged. 6
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION OF IMPOSSIBILITY
Consideration of technological impossibility and economic feasibility in setting and maintaining air pollution standards is an issue
frequently raised in CAA litigation. The language, legislative history,
and amendments of the act indicate that federal standards of air
quality control must be formulated without concession to infeasibility or impossibility:
Relaxing air quality standards to the detriment of public health
and safety misplaces our national priorities .... Certainly Congress
has at its command ... other economic tools far more powerful to

deal with national economic problems than relaxing air and water
quality standards.
Relaxation of standards may increase the profitability of some individual companies or industries. However, an accurate accounting
of the economic gains and losses to society will show a net loss. The
social costs of pollution are real. They are not reflected in industry
balance sheets, but citizens pay them nontheless.' 7
Federal intent to ignore technological feasibility in formulation of
pollution standards was set forth in congressional reports preceding
the enactment of the 1970 amendments: "Our responsibility is to
establish what the public interest requires to protect the health of
persons. This may mean that people and industries will be asked to
do what seems to be impossible at the present time."' 8 A senate
committee determination stated,
14. Id. § § 1857c-5(a) (amended 1977).
15. W. RODGERS, supra note 8, at 248.
16. See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
17. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977-Part 4: Hearing on S.251, S.252, and S.253
Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Sen. Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977) (opening statement of Sen. Gary W. Hart).
18. 116 CONG. REC. 32902 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Muskie), quoting S. Rep. No. 403,

90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
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1) the health of people is more important than the question of

whether the early achievement of ambient air quality standards protective of health is technically feasible; and 2) the growth of pollution load in many areas, even with application of available technology, would still be deleterious to public health. 1 9

Individual states, however, may consider technological capabilities
and economic impact on industry when implementing their own
plans, as long as national control levels for the entire region are met. 20
Impossible standards must be incorporated into the state implementation plan if necessary to comply with national pollution control
levels. The EPA Administrator apparently may not otherwise consider impossibility when evaluating a proposed state implementation
plan.
This was the position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in Union
Electric v. EPA. 2 1 In that case, an electric utility company filed a
petition for review of the Missouri implementation plan establishing
sulfur dioxide emission levels to which it was subject. The petitioner
argued that technological and economic difficulties made compliance
impossible. The Court refused to consider the claims of technological
and economic feasibility, holding that a reviewing court may only
consider " 'grounds'.

.

.such that, had they been known at the time

the plan was presented to the Administrator for approval, it would
have been an abuse of discretion for the Administrator to approve
the plan." 2 2 The Court held that the eight criteria in Section 110 of
the CAA are the exclusive factors in the EPA administrator's evaluation, absent other express provisions. 2 3 Because technological and
economic factors are not among the criteria listed, the Court concluded that they may not be considered in EPA evaluation of state
implementation plans and are not grounds for challenging a stateinitiated implementation plan at the promulgation stage.
Two issues left unanswered by Union Electric were whether and to
what extent infeasibility constitutes a defense at the state enforcement level. Dictum in the opinion indicates that impossibility might
be at least a partial defense to enforcement proceedings under the
CAA:
[T] he Amendments do allow claims of technological and economic infeasibility to be raised in situations where consideration of
such claims will not substantially interfere with the primary congres19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
W. RODGERS, supra note 8, at 260.
427 U.S. 246 (1976).
Id. at 256.
Id. at 264-65.
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sional purpose of prompt attainment of the national air quality standards.... Perhaps the most important forum for consideration of
claims of economic and technological infeasibility is before the state
agency formulating the implementation plan. So long as the national
standards are met, the State may select whatever mix of control devices it desires ... and industries with particular economic or technological problems may seek special treatment in the plan itself.
[T] he industry ...may obtain a variance . . . [or it] may be able to
take its2 4claims of economic or technological infeasibility to the state
courts.
Nevertheless, in Friends of the Earth v. Potomac Electric Power
Co., 2 ' a federal district court held that infeasibility does not constitute a defense at the enforcement level. 2 6 It cited Union Electric in
denying the impossibility defense, acknowledging the technology
forcing nature of the CAA. The court did mention, however, that
equitable discretion could be used in fashioning relief for violations
under the act, thereby permitting some flexibility in considering individual or unique circumstances.
In a different case also entitled Union Electric v. EPA, 2 7 the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals indicated that the impossibility defense
must be raised at the state level, if at all. 2 8 The court held that the
judiciary cannot enjoin the EPA from instituting enforcement procedures against a company in violation of infeasible standards while
it is in good faith pursuing a revision of those standards in state
court.2 I The court also held that technological and economic impossibility could be raised as a defense to an enforcement proceeding in
state court, 3 0 but it did not determine the scope of the defense or
guarantee its effectiveness. The opinion left unclear whether the state
is obligated to consider claims of impossibility when dealing with a
particular industry, or if such consideration is purely discretionary.
Assuming that states have such discretion, the court expressly left
the determination of the constitutionality of penalties for noncompliance to be decided at a future enforcement proceeding.' 1
3 2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania Power Co.,
appears to be the first state court to hold that the state does have the
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 266-67 (citations omitted).
419 F. Supp. 528 (D.D.C. 1976).
Id. at 535.
593 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1979).

28. Id. at 306-07.
29. Id. at 300.
30. Id. at 307.
31. Id.
32. Pennsylvania Dep't of Env'tl Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 490 Pa. 399, 416
A.2d 995 (1980).
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authority to reject the impossibility defense and that its imposition
of fines for violations of those standards is constitutional.
THE PENNSYLVANIA CASE
The Pennsylvania implementation plan of the federal CAA at issue
in Pennsylvania Power Co. reflects mounting concern with pollution
in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's first air pollution control legislation,
the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Control Act, 3 3 was enacted prior to
the CAA in 1960. The act implied "a cautious and conciliatory legislative attitude toward air pollution control" 3 ' and stated that its
purposes and implementation should "not unreasonably obstruct the
attraction, development and expansion of business ... but [should]
be technically feasible and economically reasonable." 3 Due to growing concern over the environment and ever-worsening pollution, the
Air Pollution Control Act was amended in 1968 to declare protection of the public welfare as its primary goal and to delete references
3
to economic and technological feasibility. 6
The Air Pollution Control Act and the CAA were both used in developing Pennsylvania's implementation plan, which was approved by
37
the EPA administrator on May 31, 1972.
The actual controversy in the case arose when the Pennsylvania
Power Company was ordered by the Pennsylvania Department of
Health, now the Department of Environmental Resources, to limit its
particulate matter emission from five coal-fired boilers in compliance
with standards under Regulation V of the Air Pollution Commission.
That regulation is now part of the Pennsylvania implementation plan.
The standards were technologically impossible to meet, so the Pennsylvania Power Company attempted to effect a compromise by proposing construction of taller emission stacks to disperse the pollution
higher into the atmosphere and decrease ground level concentrations.
The proposal was ignored by the Department of Environmental Resources, which subsequently filed a complaint for civil penalties of
$195,400 for pollution control violations. After lengthy judicial proceedings,3 8 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § § 4001-4015 (Purdon 1977).
34. Picadio, An Introduction to the Law of Air Pollution Control in Pennsylvania, 44
PA. B.A.Q. 203, 209 (1973).
35. 1960 PA. LAWS P.L. (1959) 2119, § 2.
36. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § § 4001-4015 (Purdon 1977).
37. Pennsylvania Dep't of Env'tl Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 490 Pa. 399, 416
A.2d 995, 996 n.4 (1980).
38. The Pennsylvania Power Company was ordered by the Pennsylvania Department of
Health (now the Department of Environmental Resources) to comply with Regulation V
emission limitations and it appealed the order to the Pennsylvania Air Pollution Commis-
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United States Constitution prohibits imposition of civil penalties for
noncompliance with technologically impossible standards of air pollution control.3 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently reversed the decision and remanded it for consideration of the Pennsylvania Power Company's non-constitutional claims. 4 0
The opinion first addressed the issue of whether the state Department of Environmental Resources was vested with authority under
the Pennsylvania statute to set technologically infeasible air pollution
standards. The court held that the department had no such authority. 4 In reaching this conclusion, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
appears to have adopted many of the federal policies behind the 1970
and 1977 amendments to the CAA. It stated that the "federal-state
regulatory partnership makes the federal point of view as to the permissibility of setting 'technologically impossible standards,' extremely

important to our discussion." 4 2

In addressing the question of whether impossibility should be a defense to state enforcement proceedings as a matter of public policy,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court also assimilated federal policies behind the CAA. Section 110 of the CAA requires that the state impose
technologically impossible standards through state implementation
plans, if such standards are necessary to achieve national ambient air
quality standards. The policy premise of the section is that, if forced,
American industrial ingenuity and economic incentive will respond
by stimulating development of the controls necessary to meet new
standards. 4 3 Although standards may be technologically or economsion. The Commission affirmed the Department's order, but the power company never attempted to comply with or to appeal the ruling. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania then
filed a civil complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County. That court
ordered the power company to submit a plan for compliance and it set a deadline for operational compliance. A supplemental order was also issued setting forth specific actions to be
taken by the power company in regulating emissions and penalties for failures to perform
them. The power company did not appeal the orders and submitted a plan for compliance
to the Department of Environmental Resources, proposing a compromise on certain pollution controls it considered to be technologically impossible to meet. The Department
treated that proposal as contemptuous of the lower court's order and filed two additional
legal actions against the power company: 1) a petition for civil contempt in the Court of
Common Pleas of Lawrence County, and 2) a civil penalty action before the Environmental
Hearing Board for pollution control violations. The contempt petition was denied, but the
Environmental Hearing Board assessed penalties against the power company in the amount
of $195,400. The latter decision was appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Env'tl Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 34 Pa. Commw. Ct. 546,
384 A.2d 273, 275-78 (1978).
39. Id., 384 A.2d at 286.
40. 416 A.2d at 1003.
41. Id. at 1000.
42. Id. at 998.
43. Id. at 999.
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ically infeasible at the time of their promulgation, the underlying
assumption is that the imposition of sanctions will expedite technological development in areas that would otherwise lay dormant. Congress apparently concluded that this is a desirable and efficient way
to compel industrial compliance with pollution regulations designed
to protect the general public. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited
the first Union Electric case as support for this proposition:
These requirements are of a "technology-forcing character," . . . and
are expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be economically
or technologically infeasible .... Technology forcing is a concept
somewhat new to our national experience and it necessarily entails
certain risks. But Congress considered those risks in passing the 1970
Amendments and decided that the dangers posed by uncontrolled
air pollution made them worth taking.4 4
Infeasibility and industrial "state of the art" may be taken into account when formulating state implementation plans and granting
variances only where national pollution goals will not be affected,
but the state is not required to do so. Pennsylvania's acceptance of
the doctrine of technology forcing would preclude consideration of
those factors in most instances.
The opinion cited the exclusion of consideration of technological
and economic impossibility in the amendment of the Pennsylvania
Air Pollution Control Act's declaration of policy as further demonstrating state legislative approval of technology forcing in Pennsylvania.4" Pennsylvania case law was also described as evidencing a
"very limited acceptance of the impossibility defense." 4 6 Federal
and state policies convinced the court that the state had the authority to reject impossibility and infeasibility as a defense to state enforcement proceedings. The fulfillment of those policy goals often
requires such rejection.
The court made it clear that although impossibility cannot always
be ignored, its acceptance as a defense is very limited. Wide recognition of the defense in enforcement proceedings would subvert those
federal statutory policies judicially adopted by the state. Contempt
proceedings seeking to proscribe willful disobedience were used by
the court as an example of such limited acceptance. Moreover, the
court noted that constitutional limitations on enforcement would require its availability in limited circumstances.
44. Id., quoting Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 266 (1976).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4002 (Purdon 1977).
46. 416 A.2d at 1000.
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The constitutional limitations of civil penalties for noncompliance
with technologically impossible standards of air pollution control
was the second issue addressed in PennsylvaniaPower Co. Under the
due process clause of the United States Constitution, state police
power may only be exercised to deprive citizens of their property
when a valid public interest requires such deprivation if the means
used are reasonably related to the accomplishment of the desired goal
and are not unduly burdensome. 4" The lower court held that the imposition of fines for violations of technologically impossible standards would be an unconstitutional deprivation of property without
due process. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court disagreed with the
lower court's "thesis that the assessment of civil penalties in this case
was not reasonably related to the achievement of the public [health]
interest and thus an abuse of the state's police power"'4 8 and held
that the penalties imposed were constitutional.4
The protection of the health of Pennsylvania's citizenry as regulated through air pollution controls was found to be a legitimate
state interest. 5 0 Technology forcing by the imposition of civil penalties was further found to be a reasonable means of promoting that interest.5 1 The exercise of state police power through these penalties
was therefore constitutional.
In applying the reasonable relationship aspect of the test, the
court stated that utilizing a method of civil fines for violations encourages technological innovation and paves a middle ground between the extremes of rampant pollution and total industrial shutdown.' 2 This judicial statement parallels the expressed legislative
intentions behind enactment of the 1977 Noncompliance Penalty
Provision Amendment to the CAA 3 :
The intended purposes of this provision are several: (1) to encourage compliance as effectively as possible; (2) to prevent noncomplying sources from gaining an unfair advantage over complying sources
with which they compete; and (3) to permit a middle course of
action to be followed in case of noncompliance, ratherthan requiring
47. Pennsylvania Dep't of Env'tl Resources v. Pennsylvania Power Co., 34 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 546, 384 A.2d 273, 283 (1978), citing Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
48. 416 A2d at 1002.
49. Id. at 1003.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. This provision establishes a system for the assessment and collection of fines from
noncomplying stationary sources while providing a detailed system to assure due process
before any penalties become payable. 11977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1082-83.
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plant shutdowns or permitting noncompliance without penalty.5 4
(Emphasis added)
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court thus appears heavily influenced
by federal policies in determining that state agencies may constitutionally set and impose penalties for the violation of technologically
impossible air pollution control standards.
CONCLUSION
Pennsylvania Power Co. resolves many previously unanswered important questions about the enforcement of technologically infeasible
air pollution standards and the appropriateness of the impossibility
defense. The decision seems to follow both federal and state trends
toward a stronger and more enforcement-oriented approach to air
pollution control. I Wide acceptance of the impossibility defense
would result in de-emphasizing the protection of public health in
setting standards at the state level. Judicious acceptance of this defense at the enforcement level will result in equitable decisions in
specific cases, without controverting the purpose and intent of the
CAA itself or undermining its effectiveness. To allow the defense of
impossibility indiscriminately would take the "force" out of technology forcing and would subvert the goals of Congress.
The best resolution of the problem appears to be that expressed in
Pennsylvania Power Co. -a close coordination of federal goals and
policies with enforcement of state implementation plans. In this
manner, consistent and uniform guidelines will be developed that
allow sufficient flexibility to accommodate unique situations in state
implementation.
J. MICHELE GUTTMANN

54. Id.
55. Picadio, supra note 34, at 224.

